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The negative income tax proposed by Milton Friedman represents one of the fundamental ideas of
modern welfare policy. However, the academic literature has raised two difficulties with it, one
challenging its purported work incentives and the other suggesting the possible superiority of work
requirements. In addition, work requirement approaches have gained ground in actual U.S. welfare
policy over the last 30 years and the number of different programs has proliferated, another
development counter to the negative income tax. On the other hand, the Earned Income Tax Credit
has produced a negative-income-tax-like program on a vast scale.
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The negative income tax represents one of the fundamental ideas of modern analysis of
welfare programs.   Its name derives from an opposition to a positive income tax, where the
government claims a portion of income and where the amount paid increases as income rises. 
In contrast, the negative income tax sends money back to the taxpayer, like a refundable tax
credit, but reduces the payment as income rises.   The government provides a certain level of
benefits, or reverse tax payment, even when income is zero, but then gradually withdraws those
benefits as earned income rises.   The withdrawal of benefits, or a “negative” income tax,
reduces the marginal take-home income gained from working in the same way as does a
positive income tax.    
However, whereas the work incentives of positive tax programs are generally judged by
a comparison of their effects relative to no tax program at all, the work incentives of a negative
income tax are generally judged by a comparison of their effects relative to a welfare program
with a so-called 100-percent tax rate.   In that type of program, benefits are reduced by $1 for
every $1 of additional earned income, providing no incentives to work.   A negative income tax,
by reducing benefits by less than a dollar for every dollar of additional earned income, arguably
increases work incentives.   Several decades ago, policymakers often gave little thought to the
incentives created by welfare programs and consequently most welfare programs had 100
percent tax rates, so this became the benchmark for comparison, and became the program whose
defects the negative income tax are intended to address.
In 1962, Milton Friedman proposed that all welfare programs be restructured with the-4-
negative income tax in mind, so that government support for those with low incomes would be
withdrawn only at a low marginal rate. This proposal for a consistent and explicit  negative
income tax at a low marginal rate soon found a number of academic champions, including
Lampman (1965,1968), Tobin (1966), Tobin et al. (1967), and many others.  The proposal has
has been a major influence both in policy circles and in the academic literature.   In the policy
dimension, the negative income tax proposal inspired multi-million-dollar field experiments in
the United States in the 1960s and 1970s to measure its effects on labor supply, and a version of
a negative income tax was proposed by President Nixon and considered by other presidents
thereafter.   While a negative income tax in its pure form has never passed Congress, tax rates in
existing welfare programs have been sometimes altered for work incentive reasons.  In the
academic dimension, there is a very large literature on the negative income tax and its effect on
work incentives, and the idea has filtered down to introductory economics textbooks.  Indeed,
the negative income tax has become the benchmark for the modern analysis of all means-tested
transfer programs. 
In this essay, I will review Friedman’s proposal for a negative income tax and outline
what he saw to be its chief advantages.    I will then consider two challenges to the central ideas
of the negative income tax which appear in the academic literature, one having to do with the
labor supply effects of a negative income tax which run counter to its intended work incentives,
and one having to do with using work requirements to induce increased labor supply instead. 
In addition, I will review the history of U.S. welfare policy over the last 30 years and
how it relates to the negative income tax.  The idea of using financial incentives to encourage
welfare recipients to work has ebbed and flowed over the years, and recently undergone another-5-
resurgence in policy circles, as virtually all U.S. states have lowered their welfare tax rates
subsequent to being allowed to do so by 1996 federal legislation.   The number of welfare
programs in existence has grown dramatically, and this has had a major impact on the overall
work incentives of the system as a whole, which can be thought of in negative income tax
terms. That impact has sometimes been consistent, and at other times inconsistent, with the
negative income tax idea.    But the growth of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 1990s has
introduced a type of negative income tax on a vaster scale that Friedman ever imagined.
Milton Friedman’s Negative Income Tax 
Friedman originally proposed the negative income tax in his 1962 book Capitalism and
Freedom, written with the assistance of Rose Friedman, in a brief chapter on the welfare
system.  He described how the benefit formula would work and why it would provide incentives
to work by permitting welfare recipients to experience an increase in take-home income if they
worked more.
The standard diagram illustrating these effects is shown in Figure 1, an income-leisure
diagram. The line ADD’F illustrates how income rises with increased hours of work (at the rate
determined by the hourly wage rate). The flat segment CD denotes the constraint created by a
welfare program with a 100 percent negative income tax rate, where the government guarantees
the level of income at C even with zero hours worked, but then withdraws $1 of benefits for
every $1 earned. A utility maximizing individual facing this welfare program will either choose
point C, with no hours worked, or some point on the upward-sloping segment of the budget line-6-
DD’F. The segment CD’ denotes the constraint created by an negative income tax with a lower
tax rate, where the government guarantees the level of income at C with zero hours worked, but
then withdraws less than $1 of benefits for every $1 earned.  With the negative income tax at a
rate lower than 100 percent, increased labor supply will occur as some of those who maximized
utility at C will maximize it at some choice with positive hours worked.  Their movement is
shown by the arrow from point C to point E.   The formula for benefits received by the
individual is B=G-tY, where G is the guarantee, t is the tax rate, and Y is recipient earned (or
nontransfer) income.  A version of this diagram has entered undergraduate principles textbooks
as a vivid example of how to use price theory and budget lines to analyze important public
policy issues.
Although Friedman did not give a numerical example in his 1962 essay, he later
suggested that a family of four be given a guarantee of $3600 per year (1978 dollars) and a
negative income tax rate of 50 percent.   Thus the vertical distance AC in Figure 1 would be
$3600 and each dollar of earnings would reduce the benefit by 50 cents.   When income reached
$7200, the benefit would reach zero, corresponding to point D’ in the figure.
Along with improved work incentives,  Friedman (1962) noted five other advantages to
the negative income tax. First, the negative income tax has the advantage of providing support
to poor families solely on the basis of their income, and not on the basis of some other
characteristic purported to correspond to need like old age, or whether the person is a farmer. 
Second, the negative income tax provides cash, which is the best form of support from the point
of view of the recipient. Third, a negative income tax could be substituted for the then-existing
“rag bag” of multiple programs set up to affect income distribution.. Fourth, a negative income-7-
tax could cost less than the existing system by saving administrative costs and by concentrating
benefits more easily on the poor.   Indeed, Friedman also proposed folding the negative income
tax into the tax system, integrating its rate with the positive income tax rate, and administering
it through the Internal Revenue Service.  In Friedman’s view, this integration of the positive and
negative income tax would reduce invidious distinctions between the poor and nonpoor or, in
modern parlance, reduce stigma.    Fifth, Friedman saw as an additional advantage that the
negative income tax does not distort market prices that minimum wages, tariffs, and farm
supports do, which are often also argued on the basis of distributional considerations.    All of
these advantages have figured in subsequent U.S. policy debates and hence will be discussed
further below when that policy is reviewed, as well as the central work incentive argument.
In 1969, Friedman spelled out some additional details of his views on the negative
income tax in testimony before Congress. The subject at the time was a version of the negative
income tax proposed by President Nixon called the Family Assistance Plan.   Friedman’s main
objection was that in Nixon’s approach, the negative income tax would be layered on top of
other programs then in existence, instead of replacing all those programs.   A negative income
tax on top of the other programs would result in cumulative marginal tax rates that could be
very high if a family received benefits from multiple programs, and the administrative
simplicity of the negative income tax would be lost.   In his testimony, Friedman (1969) also
reiterated some of the advantages of an negative income tax: equal treatment of equals, benefits
based solely on the objective criterion of income, and the separation of financial assistance from
other social services. In addition, Friedman noted that the Family Assistance Plan legislation
proposed that job training and other services be provided only to those on welfare, and warned1  They also note the incentives for interstate migration in the existing system, but did not
address this issue further.   This argument is usually made in support of a system with federally-
set, nationwide benefit levels rather than allowing states to set their own.
-8-
that this might draw individuals onto welfare.   This issue has repeatedly surfaced in the 1980s
and 1990s (Moffitt, 1992, 2003b).
In the 1980 book Free to Choose, Milton and Rose Friedman provided their most
detailed critique of the existing welfare system in the United States, as well as that in Britain
and other countries, along with a more detailed discussion of the negative income tax.   The
case for the negative income tax as opposed to the existing welfare system is that it will
improve work incentives, reduce the bureaucracy for administration, eliminate the multiplicity
of overlapping programs, and target benefits on the poor and not the middle class.
1    They
acknowledge that some families might have special needs that would not be met by the cash
program, but argue that such special needs could be supported by private charity.   
In an important new discussion, Friedman and Friedman (1980) discuss the tradeoff
between work incentives and cost, which had become a common subject in the 1960s and 1970s
(for example, Aaron, 1973). The problem is that if the guaranteed level of income for those who
do not work at all is set relatively high in order to provide an adequate income to those with no
other funds, and if the rate of the negative income tax at which benefits are withdrawn is
relatively low in order to provide reasonable work incentives, the overall cost of the program
may be unacceptably high. Friedman and Friedman proposed to address this problem by setting
the guaranteed level of income relatively lower than in the existing system on the argument that
the existing system, with its multiple programs, provides too much support income for those
who do not work at all.   They note the political problem created by this proposal, because it-9-
would make some families worse off, but also note that it makes a low rate for the negative
income tax and stronger work incentives possible.
Federalism and Family Structure
Two issues that have played an important role in the academic literature and policy
developments surrounding a negative income tax but which were not addressed by Friedman are
issues of federalism and family structure.
A long-standing criticism of the existing cash welfare system that first arose in the
1960s is the large variation in benefit levels across states.   In 1998, California paid $673 per
month to a family of four with no other income while Mississippi paid $144.   To some of its
proponents, a negative income tax meant also that the program would be federalized and a
national benefit level would be set, though perhaps with cost of living adjustments.   An
alternative proposal was merely to set a minimum benefit, which would ease the transition
problem by not requiring high benefit states to lower their benefits if federalism were
introduced.    This issue played an important political role because it meant, in practical terms,
that total expenditures would increase greatly because the federal benefit level would be set far
above that in many of the states.   This was a source of political support for a negative income
tax from liberals, who preferred expenditure increases, whereas Friedman preferred that
expenditure be held fixed or reduced.
The academic literature has debated the relative merits of a nationally uniform benefit
level versus a locally-determined one.  In the 1960s, most public finance economists argued that-10-
the utility of the poor entered the utility function of all taxpayers in the nation equally,
justifying a national benefit.   But Pauly (1973) argued that if local taxpayers care much more
about their own poor, redistribution could be more efficient at the local than at the national
level.   Others then argued that even if this were true, cross-state migration would create
externalities that would make such a system inefficient (Brown and Oates, 1987; see also
Brueckner, 2000 and Wheaton, 2000).     Indeed, the literature on Tiebout models of sorting of
the population by preferences for a public good often have difficulty even establishing an
equilibrium in the presence of local redistribution, given the migration problem.    For better or
worse, however, policy has moved strongly in a local public good direction as states have been
given increasing authority over benefit levels and eligibility requirements, and this issue is no
longer discussed in policy circles.
The proponents of a negative income tax also argued that it should be universal and
extended to all persons based on income and family size, but not restricted to single mother
families or even to families at all--poor individuals without children should be eligible.   While
Friedman argued that a negative income tax should be based purely on income and not other
characteristics, he did not directly address incentives to change family structure.   Offering
benefits only to single mother families creates an incentive to not marry, and offering benefits
only to those with children additionally creates an incentive to have children outside of
marriage.   Once again, extending benefits to other family types without compensating benefit
reductions or other savings would result in a significant increase in expenditure, and was
therefore often a source of support by liberals.
The theoretical literature on models of family structure generally supports the common--11-
sense proposition that offering benefits only to one family type will increase the number of
families of that type.   One exception is if welfare is viewed as social insurance and the event of
a divorce (for example) is viewed as a stroke of bad luck which should be insured against.   In
such a model, provision of insurance should actually encourage the risky endeavor, which in
this case is getting married.    However, the moral hazard problem in such insurance is the
obvious problem with the model.
It should also be noted that even a universal negative income tax would not eliminate all
incentives to not marry, at least if the tax unit is the family rather than the individual.   Two
individuals with incomes Y1 and Y2 who are both eligible for benefits on their own, but for
whom combined, married income Y1+Y2 puts them above the income eligibility point, have a
disincentive to marry relative to the situation with no program.   This is a familiar result from
the literature on the marriage penalty in the income tax (Alm et al., 1999), which has
demonstrated that it is not possible to have a tax program that is simultaneously progressive,
which bases taxes or benefits on family income and not individual income, and which is neutral
with respect to family structure.   Means-tested programs are progressive by definition--that is,
benefits are available only to those with low income--and basing benefits on individuals would
violate vertical equity considerations and create difficulties for the treatment of children.
Are the Labor Supply Effects Ambiguous? 
Two issues have been raised in the academic literature which challenge central tenets of-12-
the negative income tax. This section suggests the possibility that the labor supply effects of a
negative income tax are ambiguous; the next section discusses the role of work requirements. 
 The first question concerns whether labor supply would be increased or decreased by a
reduction in the welfare tax rate.   The problem is illustrated in Figure 2, where the negative
income tax line is now dotted and where the arrows show possible labor supply responses.   At
least some of the individuals who decided in the face of a 100 percent negative income tax rate
to work zero hours, at choice C, will now increase labor supply, as denoted by arrow 1.
However, other individuals initially chose to work positive hours and not to receive benefits and
were located on the upward-sloping portion of the budget set, DD’F.   When the negative
income tax rate is reduced, it becomes possible for these individuals to choose a combination of
higher income and less work, as shown by arrow 2, or a combination of much more leisure and 
lower income, as shown by arrow 3.   The lowering of the negative income tax rate tends to
draw onto welfare families that had not been on the rolls previously, reducing their labor
supply.   The change in average labor supply of the population is therefore ambiguous in sign. 
This ambiguity has nothing to do income and substitution effects pushing work effort in
different directions; it would remain even if substitution effects always dominated income
effects in labor supply functions.   In addition, this problem is not directly linked to cost. If the
movements shown by arrows 2 and 3 are relatively common, compared to the movement shown
by arrow 1, it is possible that both cost would increase and labor supply would fall as a result of
a lower rate for the negative income tax.   Thus the idea that the negative income tax poses a
tradeoff between work incentives and cost is not necessarily correct.
Some empirical evidence on the issue is provided in Table 1.   The table presents-13-
simulations of the effects of negative income tax programs on weekly hours of work, based on
the population of single mothers, the main eligibility group for cash welfare.   The columns of
the table show a range of different rates for the negative income tax. The rows show different
rates of guaranteed income, where G=1 means that the guaranteed income is set at the poverty
line.   A range of estimated elasticities taken from the labor supply literature was applied to a
representative sample of the population.  
Each cell in the table shows the labor supply reduction resulting from an negative
income tax of a particular guaranteed income level and negative income tax rate relative to no
welfare program at all. All entries are negative, reflecting that fact that the negative income tax,
like all means-tested transfer programs, reduces labor supply. The table shows that hours of
work rise from tax rate reductions in most cases, but the rise in hours worked as the negative
income tax rate falls are sometimes small, and sometimes the effect is even reversed.   A rise in
hours worked is more likely when elasticities are low than when they are high (e.g., going from 
-.81 to -.49 versus going from -2.06 to -2.22, for G=.50 and going from t=1.00 to t=.75), which
is a reflection of the fact that high elasticities mean a more substantial negative labor supply
response among those in the upper reaches of the constraint who become newly eligible.
The variability implied by these simulation results is confirmed by data from the
negative income tax experiments of the 1970s. For example, one experiment conducted in
Seattle and Denver in the 1970s considered the changes in labor supply at negative income tax
rates of 70 and 50 percent (SRI International, 1983, Table 3.9).  The study was able to examine
the effects of this change on husbands, wives, and single mothers. For husbands and wives, a
lower negative income tax rate reduced the quantity of labor supplied – in effect drawing more-14-
of them into the welfare system. For single mothers, a reduction in the rate of the negative
income tax usually increased labor supply but sometimes decreased it, depending on the level of
guaranteed income.   The difference in responses of the two groups is partly a result of their
different incomes.   Married men and women have higher incomes than single mothers, and
consequently are more likely to be around points D and D’ in Figure 2, whereas single mothers
are more likely to be located around point C.   But there is a nontrivial fraction of single
mothers in the upper regions as well, leading to the variability in their responses to the tax rate
reduction.
The policy lesson is that an negative income tax may increase labor supply for some
groups and not others; at some levels of guaranteed income levels and implicit tax rates and not
others; and for some income distributions and not others, depending on the relative numbers of
families at different points along the budget constraint. As a result, the effects of the negative
income tax on labor supply may differ across places, across groups, and across time.  This
finding clearly creates difficulties in making the case for an negative income tax.
This ambiguity of the negative income tax on work effort is shared by other reforms. 
For example, some welfare programs have so-called “notches,” where benefits are suddenly
reduced to zero for an extra hour of work and where the tax rate is effectively in excess of 100
percent.   For example, many of the cash programs in the U.S. such as the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families program have maximum income limits, beyond which eligibility
is lost, regardless of whether the benefit formula comes out showing that a positive benefit
should be paid.    Notches appear to cause severe work disincentives because an individual will
never work just beyond the notch.   But any method by which the notch is removed will create-15-
some new work disincentives as well.  For example, smoothing over a notch by permitting a
gradually declining benefit instead of a sharply reduced one will extend benefits up the
constraint and once again bring new individuals onto welfare whose labor supply will be
reduced (Moffitt, 2002, provides a graphical illustration).
The common element in these two examples which creates the ambiguity is that the
programmatic reform in question increases the marginal tax rate in some regions and decreases
it in others.   For example, the reduction in the negative income tax rate shown in Figure 2
decreases marginal tax rates for those initially at C but increases them for individuals initially in
the range DD’, thus increasing the slope of the budget constraint for the first group and
decreasing that slope for the second group.   Likewise, the elimination of a notch reduces
marginal tax rates for those initially at the notch, but increases them for individuals who were
initially working above the notch. 
Friedman proposed that G be lowered at the same time as t to address this problem, as
noted previously.    Figure 3 shows that G can be lowered by just enough to keep the eligibility
point--D in the figure--unchanged.   The reduction in the negative income tax rate in this case
shifts the segment CD to C’D, and individuals will move from E to E’ (and some will jump up
to segment DF).   It is unambiguous that labor supply will increase in this case, for the
extension of the budget constraint upward to the right has been eliminated.
But this example is misleading because expenditure on the program has been reduced. 
Indeed, in the limit, this approach would lead to the elimination of the program altogether,
which will maximize labor supply, to be sure.   The proper comparison is instead between two
programs with equal expenditure.  Then the question is whether any manipulation of the budget-16-
constraint can unambiguously increase labor supply, holding expenditure fixed.    The answer is
no, for if benefits are decreased in one region and increased in another, those changes will have
opposite effects on labor supply in those two regions.
A negative income tax with a lower rate might be preferred by society even if its
average labor supply effects are zero or negative. For example, if society views it as more
important to encourage most people to work at least some quantity of hours, but is less worried
if a larger proportion of the near-poor reduce their hours, then a negative income tax might be a
desirable policy even if it led to an overall reduction in the quantity of labor supplied.
Alternatively, there may be social value in redistributing income to those who are working but
still poor, for example, even if their labor supply is decreased.  The implication is that the
desirability of any welfare reform, along with the choice of the guaranteed income level and the
negative income tax rate, requires both knowledge of the distribution of the population and its
elasticity of labor supply, along with a particular social welfare function.    Reforms cannot be
picked solely on the basis of their labor supply effects; other considerations must come into
play.
The optimal tax literature is the area where formal models of this decision have been
constructed.    The most well known is that of Mirrlees (1971), who presents a model of optimal
nonlinear income taxation in which a lump sum tax, possibly negative, is combined with a
marginal tax rate to maximize a social welfare function.   A negative lump-sum tax functions
like a guaranteed level of income.   Mirrlees assumed a utilitarian objective function, which
simply sums over all utilities, and assumed that marginal utilities decline with income, implying
that there are implicit social welfare weights which are greater for those who are low income.-17-
The model thus implicitly assigns different weights to those along segments CD, DD’, and D’F
in Figure 2, for example.  Mirrlees showed that redistribution to the poor improves social
welfare for this reason, but this benefit must be balanced against costs arising from work
disincentives and consequent reductions in output.   He shows that a negative income tax is the
optimal result, and that optimal tax rates at the bottom are far less than 100 percent (in fact,
closer to zero),  implying that the utility gains at the bottom end and lower middle portions of
the income distribution from reducing the negative income tax rate are greater than the utility
losses required at higher incomes given that the societal budget constraint must be met.
Fortin et al. (1993) report results of simulations using a different social welfare function
and focusing more directly on the tradeoff between alternative guarantees and negative income
tax rates discussed here.    A class of social welfare functions based on inequality indices
proposed by Atkinson (1970) was used, which contains a single parameter which can be varied
to increase or decrease the relative social desirability of equality of incomes (actually, equality
of utility levels, for leisure is included in the utility function).    For medium levels of equality
preference,  optimal tax rates were in the range of  .50 to .55, quite close to Friedman’s
suggested tax rate, and optimal guarantees were about 66 percent of the poverty line for a
family of four, which would be $11,617 in 2000 dollars.   As the preference for equality rises,
the optimal tax rate also rises because, holding expenditure constant, this allows a higher level
of guaranteed income which benefits those at the very bottom.    Although these models should
not be taken as conclusive, they do suggest that a negative income tax can be a welfare-
maximizing decision for society, even when the labor supply disincentives for near-poor
families are taken into account – as they are in models like these. -18-
Work Requirements and Categorical Transfer Systems   
A work requirement system divides the population into those who “can” work and those
who “cannot” work. The “employables” are denied any payment if they do not work and are
provided with supplemental benefits only if they work some minimum number of hours.  The
“nonemployables” are given some guaranteed level of income, which may phase out at a low
negative income tax rate on the presumption that they might be able to work some small
amount.
Work requirements are fundamentally at odds with the idea of a Friedman-style negative
income tax.  With such a tax, nonworkers are not queried about the reason for their lack of
work, and recipients are judged only by their income, not any other characteristic like whether
they are by some criterion “employable” or “unemployable.” Work requirements are also at
odds with the idea of minimal government emphasized by Friedman, for they require an
increase in the welfare bureaucracy to administer them and to categorize people.
Other economists have criticized work requirements on three additional (for example,
Barth and Greenberg, 1971; Browning, 1975; Lurie, 1975).  First, it is argued that  that the
government cannot adequately distinguish between those who can and cannot work, and that, in
any case, there is a continuum of abilities which has no clean dividing point.   Relatedly,
economists believe that any adult with a severe disability can work at an appropriate wage and
in an appropriately supportive work environment.    A second argument is that work
requirements introduce unwarranted and potentially abused discretion into the system, as
different bureaucrats make different judgements about who is able to work and who is not.  A-19-
third concern is that any system that classifies individuals and provides them with differential
benefits creates an incentive for those individuals to attempt to change their characteristics so as
to change the box into which they are thrown.
However, the academic literature has also provided several models in which work
requirements can be seen to be advantageous. Akerlof (1978) noted that the truly needy--those
with low job skills who have extreme difficulty in becoming employed--can be partly identified
by some measurable, observable characteristic, which he called “tagging” the poor.   For
example, some combination of indications of poor health, low levels of education, and spotty
employment histories might be indicators of low job skills.   If the government moves from a
negative income tax in which all those with income are paid benefits regardless of their
characteristics to a tagged system in which only the subset who have the particular set of
characteristics indicating that they are needy are paid benefits, then money can be saved and
higher benefits could be paid to the tagged individuals without changing total expenditure.   
Akerlof partly had family structure in mind as a characteristic, for the U.S. welfare system is
heavily concentrated on families with a single parent, which can also be taken as an observable
indicator of need.   The key parameter in the Akerlof model is the fraction of the truly needy
who can be identified as such--in order words, the accuracy of the screening mechanism.   If
this parameter is sufficiently large, then the social welfare gains from giving higher benefits to
the tagged needy can outweigh the losses arising from the denial of benefits to those who are
truly needy but who do not possess the correct characteristics and hence go untagged.   Akerlof
addressed the problem of incentives to change categories as well, noting that there is a cost and
benefit to changing categories to the individual and that even if this calculation is added to the-20-
optimization problem, a tagging system could still be optimal if few enough individuals change
categories relative to the benefits of tagging.
Parsons (1996) showed that if there is “two-sided” error--that is, some of the tagged
individuals were not truly needy, as well as some of the untagged individuals being truly needy-
-then, provided the error rate does not exceed certain levels, the optimal program would provide
benefits to both groups, although greater benefits would be given to the tagged group.   A lower
marginal tax rate would be provided to the tagged group as well.   A separate negative income
tax would be given to each of the two groups.
An alternative but related argument for work requirements is that they can be used as a
screening device to deter entry onto welfare by the more able. Besley and Coate (1992,1995)
present a model along these lines that uses as a social welfare criterion that incomes should be
raised to some minimal level.  In their most comprehensive model, a combination of a
guaranteed income and a work requirement is provided to those at the bottom of the income
distribution. This program begins with a 100 percent tax rate – that is, all money must first be
earned through the work requirement –  followed by an negative income tax-like program for
those higher in the income distribution, with a less-than-100-percent tax rate.  In earlier work,
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) made a similar point by arguing that the imposition of “ordeals”
on welfare recipients, of which work requirements were one example but onerous application
procedures and participation requirements are others, could serve to deter entry.   While the
truly needy would be made initially worse off by these mechanisms, the gains in higher
transfers--because there would cost savings arising from lower entry rates by the more able--
could outweigh those losses.2 Besley and Coate (1992, 1995) note the possibility of this tradeoff. In their preferred
model, they assume that all truly needy individuals can work and would use the benefit to
supplement their earnings and hence would be no worse off.   But they acknowledge and
emphasize the importance of this assumption. 
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What these models have in common is that there is some unobservable ability upon
which the government would prefer to base transfers in a first-best world but cannot, so the 
second-best solution involves either imperfect tagging or imposing costs on potential welfare
recipients.   From this perspective, a Friedman-style negative income tax could end up as third-
best relative to a second-best work requirement program.
The empirical implications of the models in the workfare literature have not been
examined in any detail.   Exactly how much error is made in categorizing individuals, for
example, has not been determined in actual applications.   In the Akerlof (1978) model, some
truly needy families are not “tagged” and hence are made worse off by a categorical system; in
his model, it is clearly critical whether most of those who are “truly needy” are actually
identifiable as such, and how easy it is for families to change categories. The Besley and Coate
(1992, 1995)  model has the danger that making the program ungenerous, so as to deter entry,
might simultaneously penalize the truly needy who are intended to be its chief beneficiaries. 
2
Nevertheless, these models establish a prima facie case to justify both the existence of
work requirements and for categorical transfer systems that can dominate the negative income
tax in social welfare terms.
Policy Developments in the U.S. Welfare System3  States allow deductions for work-related expenses, making the ‘effective’ tax rate
lower than 67 or 100 percent.   But if those deductions are “real,” meaning that they accurately
reflect true expenses, then the true tax rate is still 67 or 100 percent.   Some states no doubt were
overly generous, however, leading to lower tax rates.
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Policy development in the area of welfare systems in the U.S. has taken several
directions over the last 30 years.   Some of these are consistent with a Friedman-style negative
income tax and some are inconsistent with it.   The three most important trends concern the
welfare tax rates, work requirements, and multiple programs.
Welfare Tax Rates   
A Friedman-style negative income tax suggests that the rate at which benefits are
withdrawn as income is earned should be kept relatively low. On the issue of whether welfare
tax rates have actually been kept low, the policy record is rather mixed.   The negative income
tax rate in the main cash transfer program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
was 100 percent from the inception of the program in 1935 through 1967, when it was lowered
to 67 percent.   The tax rate was increased back to 100 percent in 1981, on the argument of the
Reagan administration that concentrating benefits on the worst-off families was more cost
effective and also that lower tax rates bring more families onto the rolls and reduce their work
effort--precisely the theoretical point discussed above.  Clearly, neither 100 or 67 percent was a
low tax rate, particularly when the tax rates of other programs are added on top of it.
3
However, federal welfare reform legislation in 1996 replaced Aid to Families with
Dependent Children with a new program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. This
reform had a number of components, but one change was to free up states to withdraw welfare-23-
benefits at the rate they choose as earned income increases.  Since 1996, the majority of states
have lowered their implied negative tax rates on cash welfare payments significantly, with 50
percent being the most common tax rate and with a scattering of rates in the 50-75 percent range
(Gallagher, 1998, Table VI.2).   A few states still have rates at 100 percent and a few have rates
below 50 percent, even as low as zero (in which case eligibility is terminated at a notch, when
income reaches a specified maximum).   Work levels among welfare recipients in the post-1996
period have risen dramatically, for more than 30 percent of recipients now work compared to 5
percent or less in pre-reform periods. Whether this change is solely the result of the reduced tax
rates is an important question, for work requirements have also been introduced (as discussed
below) and the economy has improved over the period.
However, the most important policy development germane to welfare tax rates has taken
place outside the traditional cash welfare system, and is represented by the rise of an earnings
subsidy called the Earned Income Tax Credit. This credit provides a subsidy to earnings up to
some maximum point, after which it is phased out. The specific rates and income levels at
which the credit is phased in and phased out are different according to the number of children in
the family (Hotz and Scholz, 2003, Table 1). But in 2001, for example, taxpayers with more
than one qualifying child were eligible for a tax credit of 40 percent of income earned up to
$10,020, at which point the maximum value of the credit was $4,008. The amount of the credit
received was not reduced as income increased from $10,020 to $13,090. However, for income
above $13,090 the credit was reduced at a marginal rate of 21.06 percent – which implied that
the credit phased out completely at an income level of $32,121. 
Figure 4 shows the budget constraint created by a earnings subsidy program like the4  This assumes that the welfare program does not include the EITC in income when
computing benefits.   In fact, few states do so.
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Earned Income Tax Credit. The program creates the budget constraint ABCDE. Once again, the
effect on average labor supply is ambiguous although work effort at the lower end is likely to be
increased. The most plausible scenario is that an earnings subsidy program will increase labor
supply for those in the subsidy region where it increases the marginal returns to work (assuming
that substitution effects dominate income effects), as shown by arrows 1 and 2. However, an
earnings subsidy is likely to decrease labor supply for those in the flat and phaseout regions
where it flattens the budget curve, as shown by arrows 3, 4, and 5.
Earnings subsidies are not intended to replace welfare programs because such subsidies
do not provide any support to needy families who have no other income.   In fact, in and of
themselves, earnings subsidies are regressive in their low ranges, providing fewer benefits to
more needy families rather than greater benefits.   Actual policy provides both programs, as
indicated in Figure 5, which combines a basic negative income tax AFG, with a guaranteed
level of income and a rate at which that support is withdrawn as income is earned, with the
earnings subsidy program ABCDE.    The total tax rate faced by an individual is the sum of the
tax rates in the two programs.
4  In low ranges of earnings, an individual receiving benefits from
both programs would have a quite low tax rate.   For example, an earnings subsidy rate of 40
percent would cancel out most of a negative income tax rate equal to 50 percent, leaving only a
10 percent total tax rate.   As the earnings subsidy rate changes to zero in region BC, the total
tax rate would rise to 50 percent, and if the EITC phaseout region CD were entered before the
welfare program ended, the total tax rate would rise to 71 percent (50 plus 21 percent for the-25-
phaseout).     But after leaving the welfare program(i.e., beyond point G), the negative income
tax rate would no longer be faced at all, and either the zero region or the phaseout region of the
EITC would be faced alone, which gives a total tax rate of 0 or 21 percent, less than that of the
welfare program.   Thus the total marginal tax rate  starts low, then rises and then falls.  
However, the average marginal tax rate, measured by the average benefit reduction from going
from point F to point D in Figure 5, is lower than 50 percent, which is the marginal tax rate on
segment FG alone.  That is, the EITC lowers the average marginal tax rate and raises the
eligibility point for benefits from point G to point D.
The Earned Income Tax Credit represents an extraordinary expansion in the cash
welfare system that has extended benefits far up the income distribution.  The earned income
tax credit provides income for those earning up to $32,000 in 2001.   In comparison, cash
welfare programs, even after the reduction in their average negative income tax rates and
consequent increases in eligibility levels up to higher income points,  phase out their assistance
at the range $6,000 to $12,000 for the majority of states (Gallagher, 1998, Table III.3). 
Expenditures on the earned income tax credit passed up expenditures on cash welfare in 1996,
and the gap has widened since that time ($26 billion for the earned income tax credit and $14
for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program in 2000; see Moffitt, 2003a, Table
1).    In 2000, only six million individuals received cash welfare payment, and 55 million
received support through the Earned Income Tax Credit program (Moffitt, 2003a, Table 3).  
Thus, with a combination of the earned income tax credit and the state welfare reforms
since 1996, the United States has an effective negative income tax on a scale far beyond that
imagined by Friedman.  The level of guaranteed support has been kept relatively low--guarantee-26-
levels in state cash transfer programs are far below the poverty line, often only half of it--but the
implicit, average tax rate is also extremely low, leading to correspondingly high expenditures
and eligibility for benefits which extends high up into the income distribution.   One major
question is whether average labor supply has been increased or decreased as a result of this
super-negative income tax.   One study found that the overall effect on labor supply of women
is positive, but that while the labor supply of single mothers has been increased, the labor
supply of secondary workers, primarily married women, has been reduced (Hotz and Scholz,
2003).   This pattern fits with the earlier discussion.   The positive effect for labor supply of
single women is a reflection of the concentration of that population group in the lower income
ranges, where the earning subsidy is especially powerful.  The negative effect for secondary
workers is a reflection of the heavy representation of that group at the levels of income where
the earned income credit is being phased out.    As before, the social desirability of the program
cannot be judged on the basis of labor supply effects alone, which are typically ambiguous in
sign overall, but requires a social welfare function which weights the gains for each group.  
Work Requirements
Work requirements have been a growing feature of U.S. welfare policy starting in the
1970s, and especially following the welfare reform act of 1996, they have become a central
element of cash welfare programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
The seeds of the work-requirement philosophy appeared in the defeat of the Nixon
administration’s negative income tax plan in 1969.    According to an authoritative account of
the Congressional debate (Moynihan, 1973, Chapter 7), the negative income tax foundered-27-
partly because members of the Senate came to understand the work incentive issue and became
aware that the existing welfare program had work disincentives, which was judged to be
politically unacceptable.  A program which merely reduced those disincentives became of little
interest; politicians were unwilling to consider the tradeoffs between the guaranteed level of
support and the negative income tax rate at which that support is phased out. This unwillingness
represents a fundamental rejection of the negative income tax philosophy.
After the failure of the Nixon administration’s proposed negative income tax, work
requirements for welfare recipients were proposed by the Carter administration, albeit coupled
with a major public service employment program.   The Reagan administration encouraged
states to experiment with mandatory work programs in the 1980s, and states did so but kept
them on a small scale.   In the early 1990s, states began imposing mandatory work requirement
programs on larger fractions of their caseloads. Under the 1996 welfare reform, the federal
government required that states enroll minimum fractions of their caseloads in work or in a
work-like activity. The legislation specified that work-like activities could include job search,
but not general-purpose education and training. It also specified a work requirement of 20 hours
per week, rising to 30 per week. The work requirements adopted by the states thereafter greatly
reduced the number of exemptions that had previously been allowed, as well as imposing much
stronger sanctions for noncompliance like reductions in benefits or even full termination from
the welfare rolls.    The legislation provided for additional funds for child care, but eliminated a
rule in the pre-1996 program stipulating that recipients were not obligated to work if the
government could not provide them with child care.
The critical issue of who is deemed as employable and therefore subject to the work-28-
requirements remains unclear. Exemptions from the work requirements vary greatly from state
to state.  Discretion, the predictable accompaniment of work requirements, appears from
anecdotal evidence to be widespread (Diller, 2000, Lurie, 2001).   Caseworkers make
judgements about whether individual recipients have made sufficient effort to find a job, for
example.   No evidence is available on the overall accuracy of the employability distinctions.  
Other consequences of this shift toward work requirements are largely as predicted.    
Expenditures per welfare recipient have increased, because the government is more heavily
involved in regulating the individual lives of welfare recipients than at any point in the history
of the program, with a correspondingly significant increase in administrative costs. The work
requirements have been one major reason that the welfare caseload has fallen by over 50
percent in recent years; in turn, part of the reason for this decline is that work requirements
screen out some potential recipients who have less need for such support, as Besley and Coate
(1992, 1995) argued.  On the other hand, the prediction that work requirements allow an
increase in expenditure on those in greatest need also has support.    States have used the
monies freed up by the reduced welfare caseloads to create new programs to address special
problems for the remaining recipients, such as special job search programs, substance abuse
treatment programs, and the like.
This increase in work requirements also sheds a somewhat different light on the super-
negative income tax created by the combination of the earnings subsidy and cash welfare,
discussed above. The combined program of guaranteed income and an earnings subsidy shown
in Figure 5 is available only to those who are judged unable to work, for only that group is
guaranteed some income whether they work or not.  For those judged capable of working, the-29-
more relevant program at low hours of work is the earnings subsidy alone – since no income
support is provided without achieving some minimal hours of work like 20 or 30 per week.
Multiple Welfare Programs 
A Friedman-style negative income tax would replace all existing welfare programs.   In
this regard, U.S. policy has again moved in the diametrically opposite direction.
Table 2 shows the growth of expenditures on means-tested transfer programs in the U.S.
from 1968 to 2000.  Total per capita expenditures on all programs combined have risen over
time, but the composition has clearly shifted toward in-kind programs and special-purpose
programs for different populations. The largest growth has occurred in the medical programs,
primarily Medicaid, which has experienced a major increase.   Indeed, means-tested
expenditures for medical care in 2000 are greater than the sum of all other means-tested
expenditures. The growth in means-tested expenditures on medical care was partly the result of
increasing expenditures on the aged and disabled, but also partly the result of the extension of
eligibility for benefits to additional groups in the low income population (Gruber, 2003).   Cash
transfers also grew, primarily as a result of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Supplemental
Security Income program for the disabled.    Also experiencing growth were programs
supporting expenditures on food, housing, education, training, social services (which includes
child care), and energy.    
It is useful to separate the different issues raised by this increasing categorization. The
administrative cost of such a system clearly exceeds that of a negative income tax. Moreover,
categorization into a number of programs increases the burden of the system on the recipients-30-
themselves, as they must travel to different offices to establish eligibility and to comply with
each program’s requirements.   The participation rates of eligibles tend to decline when
programs multiply. For example, when recipients leave the cash welfare program, their
participation rates in in-kind programs drop because of the difficulty in visiting different
welfare offices (Garrett and Holahan, 2000; Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999).   Both higher
administrative and individual costs might be ameliorated with one-stop welfare offices, which
establish eligibility for multiple programs and dispense benefits in one location.    
A different issue is that the withdrawal of benefits from a number of individual
programs may potentially lead to high cumulative negative income tax rates. Given the
ambiguity of the sign of the effect of welfare tax rates on labor supply noted above, it is not
clear how serious this problem is in the aggregate. However, it is certainly injurious to the more
narrow goal of increasing labor supply among the poorest individuals.  Cumulative tax rates in
the U.S. from participation in multiple programs are nevertheless not as high as might be
expected. Because of the recent reductions in welfare tax rates and the presence of the earned
income tax credit, the implicit negative income tax rates from the cumulation of current welfare
programs are no more than 30 percent for those who work zero to part-time and no more than
47 percent in the part-time-to-full-time range (Moffitt, 2002).    At higher wage levels, however,
where the earned income tax credit and other programs are being phased out, cumulative
negative income tax rates can be as high as 80 percent.   This nonlinear schedule should be
expected to encourage individuals to work up to part-time or full-time at their existing, low5  Interestingly, this pattern of low marginal tax rates at the bottom and higher marginal
tax rates higher up the income distribution--plus presumed low tax rates again at the very top of
the income distribution (certainly lower than 80 percent)--fits the textbook optimal tax model of
Mirrlees, where a zero marginal tax rate at the top and bottom is optimal under certain conditions
Auerbach and Hines (2002) present a recent review of this literature and the assumptions needed
for it to go through.
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hourly wage rates, but to discourage them from seeking higher wages.
5
Yet another issue is the extent to which individuals change categories to qualify for
certain benefits. The classic issue in this area is whether the restriction of cash welfare to single
mothers induces non-marital childbearing and discourages marriage. The evidence suggests that
there is some effect of this kind, although the magnitude is quite uncertain (Moffitt, 2003b).   
There is anecdotal evidence that disabled women with children switch between cash welfare
and disability programs to maximize benefits or to avoid work requirements as well.   There is
essentially no evidence to date, however, on whether single mothers act to avoid work
requirements by changing behavior to become exempt.
This increasing categorization of the population springs from the same source as does
the preference for work requirements, which is to divide the population into different boxes
according to characteristics that are presumed to proxy different types of need, and with a
different program for each group.  The shift to in-kind transfers can be traced to a public
sentiment that if a segment of the population has a certain set of needs, then it should be
provided with the goods that address those needs rather than cash.  This set of preferences may
be the outcome of a voter’s utility function which contains not the utility of the poor individual,
but rather that individual’s consumption of specific goods deemed desirable to the voter6  A different rationale for in-kind transfers, at least if they are offered in fixed quantity
and not in the form of an open-ended price subsidy, is that they may be used to induce only those
families who are most needy (that is, have highest marginal utility from benefiting from the good
in question) to select themselves into the program.   See Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and
Blackborby and Donaldson (1988) for models of this type, and Heckman (1974) for an empirical
illustration in the case of a child-care tied transfer.   This argument has not played an important
role in policy circles, for while participation rates of eligibles are often less than 100 percent, this
has been judged to be partly because of lack of information on eligibility and other barriers to
entry.   Indeed, in some programs, it appears that the worst-off individuals, who are presumably
those who would benefit the most, have the lowest take-up rates.  Yet another argument for in-
kind transfers is that they constrain recipients from taking socially inefficient actions to increase
the size of the transfer (Bruce and Waldman, 1991).
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(Garfinkel, 1973).
6   Clearly the U.S. voter is revealed by these preferences to be highly
paternalistic, preferring that specific groups be judged as deserving and that they consume
specific goods viewed as meritorious by the voter.
Conclusion
In its pure form, a Friedman-style negative income tax faces some genuine concerns,
including its ambiguous effects on labor supply and the possible gains from work requirements
and categorized welfare programs. In the U.S. policy environment, some developments like the
earned income tax credit have taken the negative income tax idea farther than the Friedmans
envisioned, but other trends like work requirements and the continuing proliferation of welfare
programs run fundamentally in opposition to it.
Despite these issues and policy developments, the negative income tax has become the
touchstone of economic analysis of welfare programs, in the sense that much of the research in
this area is motivated by the negative income tax as an ideal case and is designed to either-33-
measure its effects or establish alternatives. Moreover, the concept of the negative income tax
has played a substantial role in reorienting the thinking of policymakers to the basic message
that incentives matter. While this insight does not surprise academic economists, it is a new
development in policy circles.   In the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers did a 180-degree turn
from the implicit assumption that welfare policies had zero behavioral elasticities to designing
welfare policies on the explicit assumption that the design of welfare policy had large, nonzero
elasticities on labor supply, marriage, education, child-bearing, and other matters of interest to
voters.  Many of the requirements that have been put in place are not in the spirit of a Friedman-
style negative income tax, but the focus on incentives is genuinely new. In this sense,
Friedman’s concept of the negative income tax shows the power of basic economic reasoning to
affect policy as well as research.-34-
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Effect of Negative Income Tax Plans with Different Levels of G and t
on Weekly Hours of Work of Single Mothers
                                                                            Negative Income Tax Rate
                                                   
                                                       1.00                   0.75                   0.50                   0.25
Low elasticities
    G = .50 -0.81 -0.49 -0.35 -0.33
    G = .75 -2.18 -1.08 -0.68 -0.55
    G = 1.00 -4.02 -1.74 -1.00 -0.64
High elasticities
   G  = .50 -2.06 -2.22 -2.02 -2.26
   G = .75 -4.62 -4.99 -4.29 -3.87
   G = 1.00 -7.34 -7.92 -6.50 -5.31
Notes:
G = Guarantee as a percentage of the official government poverty line
The substitution and income elasticities are .05 and -.02, respectively, in the ‘low’ case and are
.20 and -.25 in the ‘high’ case.
Source:  Moffitt (1992, Table 5)Table 2
Composition of Real Expenditures on Means-Tested Transfers, 1968-2000
(billions of FY2000 dollars)
                           Medical     Cash        Food     Housing   Education    Jobs/    Services       Energy


















































































Combined federal and state and local.spending for the largest 84 means-tested transfer programs;
each category includes all programs of that type.  The ten largest programs in 2000 are Medicaid
and Veterans Medical Care (Medical); the Earned Income Tax Credit, Supplemental Security
Income, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Foster Care (Cash); Food Stamps
(Food); Section 8 Housing Benefits (Housing); Pell Grants (Education), and the Child Care
Development Block Grant (Services).
Row percents shown in parentheses; may not add to 100 because of rounding
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Figure 5.  Earned Income Tax Credit Plus Negative Income Tax  